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Summary This article develops an analysis of the internal functioning of the 
Spanish party Podemos and its structural make-up. The used methodology con-
sists of: 1) a descriptive analysis of the development of Podemos, based on the 
available information in the media; 2) an analysis centered on the presence of Po-
demos in social networks and the mainstream media, in addition to electoral re-
sults and polls. The analysis attempts to determine the following: the party’s deci-
sion-making process, along with the type of relationships established between 
leaders and supporters; to what extent the Internet is used as a primary tool for or-
ganization, mobilization and political propaganda; and the extent of the clash or 
harmony within the interparty’s dynamics: on one hand, the bottom-up structure 
of the citizen assemblies and, on the other, the top-down structure inferred from 
Pablo Iglesias’s hyper-leadership and the media presence of the party’s principal 
leaders.1
Keywords Podemos, European Elections, New Media, Spanish Politics, Political 
Populism
Introduction1
Spain is one of the countries hardest 
hit by the global economic crisis that 
1 This study has been realized under the rese-
arch project Communication flows in proce-
sses of political mobilization: the media, blogs 
and opinion leaders (MEDIAFLOWS) (2014-
2016), funded by the Spanish Ministry of 
Economy and Competitiveness (Ref. CSO2013- 
43960-R).
began in 2007. As in other southern Eu-
ropean countries, the introduction of 
the Euro led to considerable debts both 
in the public and private sectors. In 
Spain, this debt revolved around a 
“building craze” that spurred the con-
struction of many housing and public 
works projects. However, the real estate 
bubble burst as a result of the crisis and 



























The economic situation has been ac-
companied by a rapid deterioration of 
the political climate in Spain, stemming 
from a decline in the credibility of politi-
cians and representatives from major 
national institutions. As a result, voters 
have punished the country’s two main 
political parties: the socialist PSOE party 
that governed from 2004-2011, and the 
conservative Partido Popular (PP). How-
 ever, public polls that, as of very recently 
(2012) showed a sharp decline in credi-
bility amongst political parties and tra-
ditional political figures, for years did 
not show electoral consequences stem-
ming from negative public opinion. This 
is partially due to the inability of the 
major alternative parties (which are more 
or less also considered traditional par-
ties) to attract votes. This led to a signifi-
cant portion of the electorate abstaining 
from voting altogether.
Opposition to traditional politics 
clearly manifested itself in the emergence 
of the indignados movement on May 15th 
2011 (15M movement). Protestors align-
 ed with this movement occupied public 
squares in the largest Spanish cities for 
several weeks, and undoubtedly brought 
about changes in the political agenda 
(Casero-Ripollés and Feenstra, 2012). 
Traditional political parties even recom-
mended that 15M activists form an offi-
cial political party if they really wanted 
to effect change, but 15M never became 
a full-fledged political movement. Many 
people wondered how it was possible 
that no new electoral option appeared 
on their ballots, in the same vein as Syr-
iza in Greece or Beppe Grillo’s MoVi-
mento 5 Stelle (M5S) in Italy, to channel 
the people’s dissatisfaction and benefit 
from the obvious crisis affecting the po-
litical system.
Curiously, the party that would 
emerge as this alternative, known as Po-
demos, is, at first glance, a type of hybrid 
that takes from both sides of the spec-
trum. Podemos feeds off of populist 
rhetoric and practices, as does M5S, but 
at the same time clearly traces its roots to 
leftist parties in the political sphere, as 
does Syriza. The first time that Podemos 
candidates appeared in an election, dur-
ing the 2014 European Elections, they 
achieved good results: around 8% of the 
total votes cast and 5 seats in the Euro-
pean Parliament. These are excellent 
numbers for a new political party (Pode-
mos was founded in January 2014, the 
same year as the aforementioned elec-
tions), that barely had the means to run 
an electoral campaign and mainly relied 
on the media presence of its leader, Pab-
lo Iglesias.
The emergence of Podemos was a 
real shock to Spanish politics, despite 
the perplexing fact that, for years, Span-
ish society was apparently unable to 
create successful alternatives capable of 
entering the political sphere. However, 
this was not all that changed in the 2014 
European Elections. In addition, the PP 
and PSOE obtained a combined 49% of 
the vote total; the first time in the history 
of the two-party system, which has tra-
ditionally been very strong in Spain, that 
they failed to earn at least 50% of the 
ballots cast (see graph 1).
The day after the elections took 
place, Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba, the head 
of PSOE, resigned as a consequence of 
his party’s poor returns, the lowest in its 
history (23% of the votes). The following 
week, King Juan Carlos I, whose popu-
larity had significantly withered, an-
nounced his decision to abdicate the 
throne and proclaim his son Felipe the 
new king. Over the next few months, 
polls showed increasing support for Po-
demos, so large that they showed a 
three-way tie with PP and PSOE, the 













































6)This is the context that we wish to 
analyse in the upcoming sections of this 
article. We hope to study the evolution 
of Podemos, from its beginnings to the 
current day, its strategies and ideological 
roots, the organization of its internal 
structures, its relationship with its sup -
porters, and finally, what the numbers 
and figures tell us.
Purpose of the study and methodology
We believe that interest in Podemos 
is undeniable. Podemos is the first polit-
ical party since 1982 that has threatened 
the dominance of the Spanish two-party 
system. We are concerned with deter-
mining the main elements to be includ-
ed in our analysis, whose structure is 
based primarily on two goals. First is the 
study of the organizational structure of 
Podemos, its ideological framework, 
and its political and media strategies. 
That is to say, everything that categorizes 
Podemos as a political party. Second is 
to analyse the path that Podemos has 
taken during its first year in existence, as 
well as its impact on various aspects of 
public opinion: media outlets, public 
opinion polls, social protests, and of 
course elections.
The research methodology applied 
here is in line with these two goals and 
combines two main parameters: a quan-
titative data analysis (election results, 
opinion polls, rallies, social media pres-
ence, information released through me-
dia outlets, etc.); and a qualitative analy -
sis of speeches and strategies utilized by 
Podemos during interviews, conferences 
and discussion groups organized by re-
search group Mediaflows2 with various 
representatives from Podemos. The 
com bination of this particular material 
with academic articles already published 
will allow us to establish more clearly 
our research goals outlined previously.
Podemos: origins, strategies  
and operation
Podemos was “born” on January 
17th, 2014 when various leftist political 
2 For details see www.mediaflows.es 
Graph 1. Percentage of the vote earned by the two major Spanish political parties  
 in European Parliament Elections, 1987-2014. 























activists, primarily based in Madrid 
(specifically from the political science 
department of the Complutense Univer-
sity of Madrid, where Podemos’s leader-
ship originated) published a manifesto. 
Pablo Iglesias, the undisputed leader of 
the party, Íñigo Errejón, second-in-com-
mand and chief political strategist, and 
Juan Carlos Monedero, Podemos’s third 
highest member,3 all had established 
their academic careers in this depart-
ment. Other important leaders in the 
young party include Carolina Bescansa, 
head of electoral analysis and polls, and 
Luis Alegre. Almost all of these figures 
have a long history of political activism 
and are often linked to progressive pop-
ulist governments in Latin America, 
particularly that of Hugo Chávez in Ven-
ezuela (Rivero, 2015: 82-88).
The founding of Podemos also has 
much to do with two other phenomena 
that took place. Firstly, there was the in-
ability of the leftist political bloc, Izqui-
erda Unida (IU), to benefit from the 
waning credibility of the two-party sys-
tem and their refusal to hold primary 
elections to choose candidates for the 
2014 European elections. Podemos ini-
tially sought to force IU to call for open 
primaries and, if these primaries were 
not held, the prior would run independ-
ent campaigns. In addition, Podemos 
leaders were aware of the fact that the 
mediatisation of politics was essential in 
forging new political leadership. Media 
outlets, specifically television, with their 
unique ability to condense messages and 
present them effectively to large audi-
ences, are considered to be the playing 
field utilized by the new breed of politics 
(Mazzoleni, 2014: 43).
3 Monedero eventually left politics just before 
the regional and local elections on May 24th, 
2015.
The concept of political participa-
tion and activism through the media did 
not originate with Podemos, but its ef-
fectiveness was corroborated by the Po-
demos experience. In 2010, a television 
program called La Tuerka was created 
that consisted of political discussions 
moderated by Pablo Iglesias. The pro-
gram aired weekly on various local tele-
vision stations in Madrid, and also 
reach ed a wider audience through inter-
net broadcast. Many future leaders of 
Podemos gained invaluable experience 
from their participation on La Tuerka, 
learning how to handle themselves in 
front of the cameras and especially how 
to debate on television against individu-
als who represented ideologies opposed 
to their own. This constituted an essen-
tial learning experience for Podemos 
leaders in terms of situating themselves 
in the conceptual framework of media-
tized politics, in which television plays 
the most important role. As Iglesias 
himself stated:
Political discourse now more than ever 
is built around audiovisual products and 
devices. What we have here is a battle to 
define what reality is (…) People believe 
that the battle is waged between parties 
or political groups, but that’s not true. 
The battle is fought in the media 
(Domínguez and Giménez, 2014: 15).
Starting in 2014, Pablo Iglesias be-
came a regular guest on political debate 
programs on different national televi-
sion channels. He began by appearing as 
the “exotic” counterpoint on more con-
servative programs with small, yet not 
insignificant audiences in discussions 
that were heavily biased to defending the 
conservative order. Later, towards the 
end of 2013, Iglesias made the jump to 
other political debate programs on ma-
jor private television stations in Spain, 














































channels (especially La Sexta) have lately 
become outlets for analysis, information 
and opinions that are critical of Partido 
Popular and that espouse a progressive 
point of view. On these programs, Igle-
sias debated with leaders from the major 
political parties and also with (or rather, 
against) renowned journalists from con-
servative media.
This media presence is essential to 
understanding Podemos’s success and 
goes hand in hand with its ideological 
base. There are two main intellectual 
foundations that underpin Podemos’s 
methods, and especially those of its chief 
political strategist, Íñigo Errejón. First, 
there is the notion of populism, which 
comes from the work of Argentine polit-
ical scientist Ernesto Laclau (2005). Er-
rejón, following the writing of Laclau, 
has called for a different type of pop-
ulism that distances itself from classical 
revisionists, and that leans towards a 
more critical evaluation of its character-
istics and effects (Taguieff, 2002). This 
breed of populism eschews ideological 
parameters that fall directly in line with 
the left-right political spectrum. Instead, 
it seeks opportune moments to occupy 
major spaces that have been ignored by 
existing powers, giving these spaces 
meaning and the ability to mobilize po-
litically through discourse (Errejón, 
2015: 133-134). This is a strategy that, as 
we have seen, had enormous potential in 
Spain, given the disconnection between 
the majority of citizens and the repre-
sentatives of traditional parties, espe-
cially with regards to a few key pressing 
issues (such as unemployment, housing, 
and the decline in public services).
In addition, Podemos’s strategies 
were heavily influenced by the works of 
Italian Marxist thinker Antonio Grams-
ci. Of particular weight was Gramsci’s 
concept of “hegemony” and discursive 
strategies that could be employed by so-
cial actors to achieve it. The “discourse” 
would be the packaging for what has al-
ready taken place, like a set of recog-
nized and unrecognized activities that 
make sense out of certain social facts. 
Political discourse in this context pre-
sents itself as a permanent translation of 
reality, redefining what makes sense.
In such a translation, simplification 
is inevitable. The discourse begins with 
complex situations and ideas that are 
necessarily transferred to the public 
sphere condensed and summarized 
(Domínguez and Giménez, 2014: 90). 
Reality is often reduced to stereotypes 
easily handled and assumed by the pub-
lic. This is what occurs in the media and 
in the products of the culture industry, 
for example, but also in more immedi-
ate, smaller social circles such as group 
conversation, whether in person or on-
line. It goes without saying that the same 
happens in institutional discourse, as 
well.
As previously mentioned, these 
found ations established a political strat-
egy that blurred the classic dialectics re-
volving around right and left. The dis-
course traced by Podemos assumes an 
underlying political and social hegemo-
ny in opposition to an institutional sys-
tem hijacked by the traditional parties in 
harmony with the interest of the elites 
or, in other words, the classic dialectics 
of populism (Kessel, 2014: 101), struc-
tured around distinctions between the 
“People” and the “Elites”, “those on top 
and those at the bottom”, etc., so com-
mon throughout Podemos’s rhetoric.
These discursive strategies, simpli-
fied in order to captivate the larger pub-
lic, were applied through Pablo Iglesias’s 
many appearances in the media, the 
main source of Podemos’s notoriety and 























the party’s first few months as well as 
now. Nonetheless, Iglesias undoubtedly 
garnered the lion’s share of his fame on 
television, where he could deliver his 
message to millions of people. TV is also 
his party’s primary tool for spreading its 
ideas and arguments, condensed and 
simplified in a TV-friendly fashion, such 
as the aforementioned idea of the “elite” 
(an idea that is also commonplace in the 
rhetoric of Beppe Grillo and his M5S 
movement). This elite (la casta in Span-
ish) refers to Spain’s political-economic 
establishment defended by the PP and 
the PSOE, which is in opposition to the 
“People” (represented by Podemos). 
Also present is the notion of “patriotism” 
as a value unbefitting of a corrupt politi-
cal-economic class that commits tax 
evasion and allows fundamental public 
services such as healthcare and educa-
tion, highly valued by the Spanish peo-
ple, to deteriorate. These dialectics have 
been extremely important in Podemos’s 
ability to communicate, from the get-go, 
with heterogeneous groups of people, 
whether in terms of economic class, pol-
itics or geography.
The 2014 European Elections cam-
paign revolved around the figure of Igle-
sias, given that the vast majority of Span-
iards were unaware of Podemos’s exist-
ence, even at the moment of casting 
their votes. So it was that, according to 
Sarah Bienzobas in the Seminar organ-
ized by the Mediaflows Group in No-
vember 2014 (Periodismo.umh.es, 2014) 
the campaign made an important strate-
gic decision: the Podemos ballot would 
feature an image of Iglesias himself as its 
logo, given that, although only 6 per cent 
of Spaniards knew of Podemos the day 
of that decision (March 2014, two 
months before the elections), more than 
half of the country knew who Iglesias 
was.
Naturally, as Podemos’s initiative 
bore fruit, the party continued with the 
same strategy. Iglesias established an in-
disputable hyper-leadership of his party, 
despite some tensions. This was because, 
above all, Iglesias and the group of lead-
ers around him, who also come from the 
Complutense University of Madrid, 
gradually sought to establish a highly 
hierarchized command structure, as op-
posed to the horizontal (and anarchic) 
character of the “Circles”, the local or 
sectorial assemblies that had been or-
ganized throughout the country as the 
primary structure of the new party, even 
before the May 2014 elections.
The circles and the party itself estab-
lished two complementary structures, 
which to some extent derive from the 
experience of many Podemos activists in 
the 15M movement (Micó and Case-
ro-Ripollés, 2013: 6-9): the actual as-
semblies, carried out in Spanish cities 
and towns, on the one hand, and the 
constant debate, dissemination of adver-
tisements and the amassing of resources 
that took place, from the onset, via In-
ternet and novel initiatives such as 
crowd- funding, in order to finance the 
electoral campaign and the party’s later 
acts, on the other (Fenoll and Sánchez, 
2016). By the same token, most deci-
sions were made via online voting of 
Podemos sympathizers, there was a spe-
cific Reddit page for discussion revolv-
ing around the party and, of course, the 
party was ubiquitous throughout social 
media, which we will discuss later on.
The tension between Iglesias’s high 
profile, the core of leaders and the de-
centralized nature of the local assemblies 
resolved in the party’s founding confer-
ence in Vistalegre, Madrid in October 
2014. In it, Iglesias is elected as the par-
ty’s Secretary General and Podemos es-














































power is highly centralized in the hands 
of Iglesias and his followers, elected in 
the “Citizen State Council” (Podemos’s 
main governing body).
From that moment on, it has been 
crystal clear that Podemos is, above all 
else, the party of Pablo Iglesias, and that 
the populist dialectics, the call upon the 
“People” to get involved in various pub-
lic issues, is highly influenced by the 
manipulated figures of hyper-leadership 
who, at the moment of truth, will be the 
embodiment of that rhetoric, both in the 
media and in political action. In fact, 
Iglesias imposed an election model for 
the 20th December elections that was to-
tally closed and centralized and featured 
but one, non-negotiable list. In other 
words, in the struggle between the hy-
per-leadership media figures and the 
decentralization and horizontalness of 
the assemblies, the former has once 
again come out on top.
Podemos in numbers
As previously discussed, Podemos’s 
media strategy is inseparable from its 
political strategy and, in fact, the success 
of the former has largely led to the suc-
cess of the latter. The media presence has 
been achieved in all kinds of media, but 
from the onset two have stood out: the 
marked use of TV, on the one hand, and 
the use of the Internet and social media 
as a way to spread messages, forge con-
sensus and mobilize the electorate, on 
the other (Casero-Ripollés et al, 2016).
Both strategies have developed at 
roughly the same time and feed into 
each other. For example, Iglesias and his 
followers first appeared on TV on the 
show La Tuerka in 2010. Shortly thereaf-
ter, in 2011, Iglesias began to use Twitter. 
His presence online and in social media 
have been an important factor explain-
ing Iglesias’s attractiveness for TV shows, 
as this presence allows the shows to 
reach a younger audience and re-dis-
seminate interviews and conferences 
given by Iglesias (and later by other Po-
demos leaders, too) on the Internet, 
thereby increasing their impact. This 
strategy obviously interests Podemos, as 
well. Private TV channels and Podemos 
have established a virtuous cycle of large 
audiences and social impact through 
online networks – whether simultane-
ously or following the TV broadcast – 
for the benefit of both parties.
Actually, the audience share explains 
a good deal of Podemos’s TV popularity: 
the fact that Pablo Iglesias had been in-
vited to participate in political talks long 
before Podemos came into being. Politi-
cal debate programs, which began to 
proliferate on Spanish TV starting in 
2013, rely on Podemos leaders (prefera-
bly Iglesias himself) to improve their 
ratings. For months, Podemos has been 
on the tip of everyone’s tongue, includ-
ing that of its political rivals.
Following the electoral surprise of 
May 25th 2014, the audience ratings 
demonstrate the party’s popularity, as 
well as that of Iglesias. His appearance 
on a TV program can cause its ratings to 
skyrocket. For example, the Iglesias in-
terview on Telecinco’s news hour (the 
main privately-owned channel in Spain) 
in February 2015 garnered more than a 
22% share. Not long before that inter-
view, the same Telecinco program fea-
tured interviews with the Prime Minis-
ter Mariano Rajoy (19% share) and the 
leader of the opposition, the socialist 
Pedro Sánchez (16% share) (Elmundo.
es, 2015). During Iglesias’s first appear-
ance on the “all news” TVE 24 Horas, 
the program earned a 3.1% share, three 
times higher than usual. Likewise, on La 























debate show, Iglesias has always earned 
the program considerably greater audi-
ences. As Iglesias himself explained on 
the program Salvados, his TV success is 
no mystery: “private channels feature us 
because we’re profitable and we give 
them audience, not because of freedom 
of expression” (Formulatv.com, 2014: 1).
The TV popularity of Podemos and 
Iglesias also has a multiplier effect on the 
Internet, particularly on social media. 
Their most controversial YouTube vide-
os earn millions of views and become 
extremely viral. As aforementioned, de-
bate on social networks regarding TV 
programs is also a source of visibility 
and “social contagion” for Podemos. 
Take, for example, public television’s 24 
Horas, during which the host insinuated 
that Pablo Iglesias supported the terror-
ist group ETA. The comment outraged 
the public on Twitter. More than 20,000 
people published nearly 100,000 tweets 
about the interview. 40% of those tweets 
made use of the hashtag proposed by 
Podemos, #Pabloen24H, instead of the 
show’s official #LNPabloIglesias, which 
was used in only 25% (Globalinmedia.
com, 2016). Social networks are another 
extremely important ingredient for the 
success of Podemos.
Their presence on Twitter and Face-
book is much greater than that of any 
other political party, whether dealing 
with the parties’ general accounts or 
those of the leaders themselves. The ta-
ble 1 features the four national parties 
who had the best results in the recent 
legislative elections, in addition to their 
national leaders. As the table shows, Po-
demos and Pablo Iglesias’s presence on 
Twitter is much greater than that of any 
other party or leader. We find similar 
numbers for Facebook (see table 2). The 
official Podemos account has the most 
followers and is the primary channel 
through which the party spreads its mes-
sages and entertains dialogue with users. 
Both Podemos and Iglesias are much 
more popular online than any of their 
rivals, despite the fact that the latter have 
been using social media for much longer 
and, in the case of Mariano Rajoy, have 
much greater visibility given the incom-
parable amount of attention garnered by 
any prime minister.
The question remains: to what does 
Podemos owe its dominance? On the 
one hand, as we shall discuss later, Pode-
mos undoubtedly relies on a younger 
electorate than the PP or PSOE, a demo-
graphic perhaps more accustomed to 
using social networks. On the other, it is 
clear that the new parties, not just Pode-
mos, strongly prefer social networks to 
spread stories of interest as well as to 
organize the party internally (Case-
ro-Ripollés et al, 2016). Some organiza-
tions, such as the Italian MoVimento 
Cinco Stelle, are in fact built almost en-
tirely online (Giansante, 2015: 43). Po-
demos is another example where the 
lack of resources and a physical locale, at 
least at the beginning of the party’s life, 
has to be substituted by a constant on-
line presence.
Lastly, it should be made clear that 
Podemos and Iglesias not only use the 
Internet, rather they also use it well. The 
Internet and social networks in particu-
lar are platforms for communication, 
debate, channelling political affinities, 
forging consensus and, in short, political 
mobilization. Here it is not simply a 
fruitless, for-show procedure, as it has 
been with the “old” parties (López et al, 
2015). Quite the contrary, Podemos and 
Iglesias have sought to involve social 
media users and make them participants 
in a virtuous cycle: on the Internet, one’s 















































Podemos definitively corroborates 
Chadwick’s theory (2013) regarding the 
characteristics of a hybrid media system 
in which both the new and old media 
would have a role. According to Chad-
wick, those political activists capable of 
exploiting the system’s potential and the 
intersections of old and new media 
would especially benefit from the hybrid 
system.
The public’s active role is further ex-
emplified by online voting mechanisms, 
used often by Podemos, which are, fur-
thermore, open to anyone who wants to 
enrol in the voting process or register as 
a candidate. Voters come out in droves: 
the aforementioned founding assembly 
in Vistalegre saw more than 95,000 peo-
ple vote for Iglesias’s list of candidates in 
an event that helped him consolidate his 
power at the head of the party. Eighty-
five thousand people voted in January 
2015 in order to elect Podemos’s local 
leaders throughout Spain, whereas more 
than 100,000 participated in a demon-
stration convoked by Podemos in Ma-
drid on January 31st, 2015, during which 
the party presented itself as the main al-
ternative to the PP during the soon to 
begin electoral odyssey.
Table 1. Twitter followers of Spanish political parties and leaders,  
as of 12 August 2016





Mariano Rajoy (PP) 17,800 1,250,000
Pedro Sánchez (PSOE) 19,500 381,000
Albert Rivera (Ciudadanos) 42,400 654,000
Pablo Iglesias (Podemos) 12,500 1,830,000
Source: author
Table 2.  Facebook followers of Spanish political parties and leaders,   






Mariano Rajoy (PP) 220,758
Pedro Sánchez (PSOE) 143,298
Albert Rivera (Ciudadanos) 292,778
























The numbers appear to corroborate 
the democratic nature of Podemos and 
the party’s respect for the citizenry’s 
opinion. Nonetheless, we also see – as 
Bimber (1998) pointed out ahead of his 
time – a new example of the practical 
limitations of direct democracy models 
and of the fascination with “accelerated 
pluralism”: emphasizing a mass demo-
cratic model, which allows for more and 
more hierarchized and one-directional 
actions by the party, and by Iglesias him-
self, through voting which is largely di-
rected by Iglesias’s charisma and his 
 visibility, unmatched by that of any al-
ternative. Furthermore, alternatives are 
sys tematically isolated from access to 
the list of candidates and the decision- 
making process. The party’s origins may 
be democratic, but the composition of 
power excludes any chance of integrat-
ing dissenting voices.
In this general review of the data on 
Podemos and of what we can glean re-
garding the party’s trajectory and char-
acteristics, the most crucial thing is left 
to be scrutinized: the votes. On the one 
hand, there are the actual votes that Po-
demos has earned in the five electoral 
contests to date, while on the other, there 
are the projections of subsequent opin-
ion polls.
Podemos won 8% of the vote in last 
25th May’s European Elections, enough 
to make it the fourth-most voted for 
party. No poll had predicted such strong 
results, and most said the party would 
fail to win any seats (it won five). This 
should not be surprising: public opinion 
surveys tend to be conservative and un-
dervalue the responses of those polled, 
who often state their intention of voting 
for a new party without this intention 
translating to actual votes. This tendency 
has held true with Podemos: the party 
typically has higher voter intention fig-
ures than its main rivals (the PP and the 
PSOE), whose voters tend to hide their 
intentions to a much greater degree.
The trends in voting intention for 
Podemos speak for themselves. The fol-
lowing graph is based on the average of 
the main voting intention polls in Spain 
between the 2011 and 2015 legislative 
elections. The graph shows stagnant vot-
ing intention for the two major parties 
before the emergence of Podemos. Sup-
port for the two major parties has clearly 
eroded, for the PP in particular, given 
that this party has been in power and the 
PSOE had suffered a major setback in 
the previous legislature, as a direct cause 
of its Government’s performance. The 
alternatives to the two-party system, IU 
and UPyD (the maroon and magenta 
lines, respectively), also rise, but to a 
much lesser extent, and cannot capture 
the voters who abandoned the PP and 
PSOE and mostly abstain from voting.
The emergence of Podemos, as seen 
in the graph, rapidly changes that situa-
tion. The first polls following the May 
2014 elections give Podemos a voting 
intention of 15%, almost twice that ob-
tained on 25th May. This is largely due to 
the bandwagon effect of the party’s elec-
toral results and the fact that many po-
tential Podemos voters learned of the 
party’s existence and above all of the 
possibility that a vote for the party con-
stitutes an effective “protest vote” 
(Fernández-Albertos, 2015: 38).
After the summer and until the end 
of 2014, Podemos’s voting intention con-
tinues to rise, even surpassing the PSOE 
and, in many polls, the PP, too. Thus, 
according to many polls, it becomes a 
party capable of winning legislative elec-
tions. Nonetheless, beginning in late 
January or early February of 2015, this 
tendency begins to subside, and al-






















































































































voting intention of 15% (an important 
level in Spain, given that this is the floor 
above which electoral penalization caus-
 ed by distribution of seats in what are 
often sparsely populated regions beings 
to significantly taper off), it never reach-
es PP or PSOE levels of voting intention. 
We have determined three potential ex-
planations for this change.
Firstly, the emergence of Ciudadanos 
(eng. Citizens) had effect. As Podemos 
rose, many conservative voices clam-
oured for the formation of a “right-wing 
Podemos”, which would carry out more 
or less the same electoral mobilization 
function among abstaining PP voters 
(Podemos depends much more upon ex 
socialist voters and ex IU voters). That 
“right-wing Podemos” turns out to be 
Ciudadanos, a party born in Catalonia 
and vehemently opposed to Catalonian 
nationalism. Ciudadanos leverages the 
European Elections as a way to intro-
duce itself in Spain (it obtained two Eu-
ropean seats). The party benefits from 
the near disappearance, in just a few 
months, of the centrist UPyD, in addi-
tion to the media visibility and charisma 
of its leader, Albert Rivera, who in many 
ways can be considered the “right-wing 
Pablo Iglesias”. As logic would have it, 
Ciudadanos’ strong ‘mise-en-scène’ was 
a threat to the other parties, especially 
the PP and Podemos.
Secondly, variations in strategy were 
important. As previously mentioned, 
Podemos has a before and after moment 
following its founding assembly in 
Vistalegre, in October. From that mo-
ment on, Podemos becomes a much 
more explicitly hierarchized project, 
controlled by its leaders and by Pablo 
Iglesias. Still more, it tries to change its 
positions, coming much closer to the 
political centre, and attempts to avoid 
“scaring” the electorate. This change in 
strategy can be seen in the media, where 
Podemos’s appearances on TV, and par-
ticularly those of Iglesias, are much more 
spaced out beginning in November 2014 
(following an interview with La Sexta 
journalist Ana Pastor, who puts Iglesias 
in a tough spot on several occasions). It 
is hard to know if Podemos’s fall is a di-
rect consequence of these changes, but 
clearly, the party is unable to temper the 
public’s perception of Podemos as a far-
left party. Also palpable are the media’s 
attacks on Podemos, especially regard-
ing its ties with Venezuela and the ideo-
logical principles and experience of the 
party bosses.
Thirdly, in March and May of 2015 
Podemos faces two back-to-back elec-
toral contests, its first since the Europe-
an Elections. The results, albeit good, 
and undoubtedly praiseworthy for such 
a young party, fail to meet expectations. 
Podemos obtained 15% of votes in An-
dalusian regional elections in March, 
along with similar results in the 13 re-
gions that held elections in May. In no 
region does it manage to surpass the PP 
or the PSOE or form a government. It 
does achieve excellent results in some of 
the country’s major cities, and Podem-
os-backed candidates win the mayorship 
in Madrid, Barcelona (the country’s sec-
ond city) and in Zaragoza (the fifth-larg-
est city), among others. Nonetheless, we 
should point out that these candidates 
did not pertain exclusively to Podemos, 
rather they were popular unity candida-
cies in which Podemos and other parties 
and organizations, generally led by non- 
partisan public figures, participated. 
Thus, in these cases, victory, though un-
deniable, was not the exclusive property 
of Podemos. In addition, the bad results 
in Catalonian regional elections, held in 
September 2015, increased the perspec-















































The following table displays a sum-
mary of the votes cast for the four major 
parties in the different electoral contests 
having taken place in Spain since May 
2014. Included are the results of the Eu-
ropean Elections, the elections of the 
four most populous regions of Spain 
where elections were held, and those of 
the five biggest cities. Finally, we can see 
the results of December 2015 and June 
2016 national elections.4 To this end, we 
should point out that in Barcelona and 
Valencia, in order to obtain a detailed 
image of the electoral map, the national-
ist and local parties should also be in-
cluded – some had excellent results, with 
CiU as the second most voted for party 
in Barcelona and Compromís the second 
most voted for in Valencia. Furthermore, 
in local elections, the candidacy did not 
exclusively pertain to Podemos, but 
4 Podemos ran for this election co-allied with 
Izquierda Unida, which obtained 3.67% of 
popular vote in 2015 elections.
rather came from a popular unity in 
which Podemos participated. In fact, 
Podemos did not run for municipal of-
fice under that name, and in the coun-
try’s most populous cities it only partici-
pated in popular unity candidacies.
Still to be analysed is the demo-
graphic make-up of the Podemos elec-
torate. To that end, the work of Fernán-
dez-Albertos, featuring an analysis of 
the 2014 European elections results and 
the information provided by subsequent 
CIS polls (Spain’s institute of public 
opinion surveys) proves quite illustra-
tive. The data therein reveal a wide pool 
from which Podemos draws its votes, 
mostly from IU and PSOE, with a small-
er but hardly insignificant percentage 
coming from the PP and from abstainers 
(Fernández-Albertos, 2015: 86).
Regarding demographics for Pode-
mos voters in the 2014 European elec-
tions, the average voter is more urban 
than rural. The party’s voters are concen-
Table 3. Percentage of vote obtained by PP, PSOE and Podemos in the 2014-2016 
Spanish electoral season
Elections PP PSOE Podemos Ciudadanos
European elections (May 2014) 26.06% 23% 7.97% 3.16%
Elections in Andalusia (March 2015) 26.76% 35.43% 14.84% 9.28%
Regional elections – Madrid 33.1% 25.44% 18.59% 12.14%
Regional elections – Valencia 26.25% 20.3% 11.23% 12.31%
Local elections – Madrid 34.55% 15.28% 31.85% 11.41%
Local elections – Barcelona 8.7% 9.63% 25.21% 11.05%
Local elections – Valencia 25.71% 14.07% 9.81% 15.38%
Local elections – Seville 33.08% 32.14% 9.01% 9.03%
Local elections – Zaragoza 26.88% 18.65% 24.57% 12.29%
Elections in Catalonia (September 2015) 8.5% 12.74% 8.94% 17.93%
National elections (December 2015) 28.7% 22% 20.7% 13.9%
























trated in Madrid, where most of its lead-
ers hail from, but there is also a marked 
uniformity throughout all of Spain, in-
cluding highly competitive, difficult re-
gions such as Catalonia. The economic 
crisis proves to be a determining factor 
in a voter’s support of the party or lack 
thereof, especially in the strongholds of 
the left (Fernández Albertos, 2015: 78). 
Lastly, the post-electoral CIS data show 
the decisive weight of the youth vote for 
Podemos and the generation gap that 
arises beginning in May 2014 between 
voters of the new parties, especially Po-
demos, who are mostly young, and those 
of the PP and PSOE, most of whom are 
over 50.
According to Fernández-Albertos’ 
hypothesis, the Podemos voter profile 
changes after the 2014 European elec-
tions. Leading up to the elections, the 
average Podemos voter was young, high-
ly politicized, up-to-date on current 
events, and an avid user of the Internet 
and social networks as a tool for getting 
informed and interacting socially (Fer-
nández-Albertos, 2015: 50). An activist 
profile, generally urban, which would, as 
per subsequent CIS polls, later become 
more transversal and also harder hit by 
the crisis.
Such a shift, indeed, seems logical: 
the party’s initial supporters are the po-
litical equivalent of early adopters, those 
who knew of the party from its onset 
and decided to vote for its candidates in 
an electoral contest which, lest we forget, 
has low voter participation rates – just 
45.84% in 2014. Later on, the party’s ex-
istence having been solidified due to its 
electoral results and its constant pres-
ence in the media, the larger public be-
comes aware of Podemos. From this 
group as a whole the party would earn 
the votes of those citizens most dissatis-
fied with Spain’s situation, mainly due to 
the economic crisis and the direct effect 
that it has had on most people’s lives. 
Thus, in the words of Fernández-Alber-
tos, having begun as the “party of the 
indignados”, Podemos would become 
“the party of the excluded”.
Conclusions
Our analysis of the characteristics 
and evolution of Podemos, both as a 
party and as a political phenomenon, 
has sought to offer a wide and varied 
perspective that deals with the internal 
as well as external factors of this political 
force. We have deduced, from outside 
information such as polls, electoral re-
sults and TV audience ratings, and from 
internal decisions such as a turn towards 
the political centre, a moderation of the 
party’s discourse and an increasingly hi-
erarchized structure, that Podemos has 
traversed an initial effervescent phase. 
During this phase, the party’s populist 
rhetoric saw not only electoral success, 
but also the public’s fascination and the 
integration within the party’s internal 
dynamics of direct democracy logic. 
Now, Podemos has reached a period of 
stabilization. The party may find itself in 
a transition phase between the insurgent 
phase and the established phase, in 
keeping with the four phases of populist 
parties (Mazzoleni, 2014: 51-52).
During this transition, Podemos’s 
“winning formula” seems to have run its 
course. In the tension which has existed 
from the party’s onset between the de-
centralization of the assemblies and the 
hyper-leadership in the media, the latter 
is much more likely to prevail. The way 
Podemos calls upon its sympathizers to 
take action, albeit constant, has slowly 
but surely proven to be more of an in-
strumental resource than as an effective 
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much more around television than so-
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we must not underestimate the impor-
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complement to television.
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Španjolsko “yes, we can!” protiv dvostranačkog sustava:  
razvoj političke stranke Podemos
SAŽETAK Članak analizira unutarnje funkcioniranje španjolske političke stranke Podemos 
i njezine strukture. Uporabljena metodologija sastoji se od: 1) deskriptivne analize razvoja 
Podemosa, utemeljene na podacima dostupnima iz medija; 2) analize usmjerene na pri-
sutnost Podemosa na društvenim mrežama i mainstream medijima, uz izborne rezultate i 
ankete. Analiza nastoji odrediti sljedeće: kakav je proces odlučivanja u stranci te kakvi su 
odnosi uspostavljeni između vođa i pristaša; u kojoj je mjeri uporaba interneta primarni 
alat za organizaciju, mobilizaciju i političku propagandu; te razinu (ne)sklada unutarstra-
načke dinamike djelovanja između s jedne strane, “odozdo prema gore” strukture građan-
skih vijeća i, s druge, “odozgo prema dolje” strukture hipervodstva Pabla Iglesiasa i medij-
ske prisutnosti glavnih vođa stranke.
KLJUČNE RIJEČI Podemos, europski izbori, novi mediji, španjolska politika, politički popu-
lizam
